The Transcription
of a Lecture
By The Ancient
Stoic Philosopher
Musonius Rufus

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An
Editorial Note:
The following text
is reproduced from
www.TheStoicLife.Org . Readers can see
another version of
the Lecture in the volume
“Musonius Rufus”, translated by Cynthia
King, CreateSpace,
2011, published by
William B. Ervine,
102 pp.
(CCA)
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That There is No Need Of
Giving Many Proofs for One Problem
Once when
discussion turned upon proofs or demonstrations, such as beginners must learn
from their teachers of philosophy in gaining a mastery of whatever they are
studying, Musonius said that there was no sense in seeking many proofs for each
point, but rather cogent and lucid ones.
Thus just as the physician who prescribes many drugs
for his patients deserves less praise than the one who succeeds in helping them
with a few, so the philosopher who teaches his pupils with the use of many
proofs is less effective than the one who leads them to the desired goal with
few. And the pupil too, the quicker his intelligence, the fewer proofs he will
require, and the sooner he will assent to the conclusion of the argument in
question, provided it be sound. But those who require proofs at every point,
even where the matter is perfectly clear, or demand to have demonstrated at
length things which could be explained briefly are completely inept and
dull-witted.
The gods, we may assume, need no proof of anything
inasmuch as nothing to them lacks clearness or is obscure, and it is only in
reference to obscurity that there is any need of proof. Man, however, must needs
seek to find out that which is not plain nor self-evident through the medium of
the plain and obvious. That is the function of proof. Take for example the
proposition that pleasure is not a good. At first sight we do not recognize it
as true, since in fact pleasure appeals to us as a good. But starting from the
generally accepted premise that every good is desirable and adding to it a
second equally accepted that some pleasures are not desirable, we succeed in
proving that pleasure is not a good: that is we prove the unknown or
unrecognized by means of the known or recognized. Or again, that toil is not an
evil is not on the face of it a persuasive proposition, while its opposite,
that toil is an evil, seems much more persuasive. But starting from the known
and accepted premise that every evil is a thing to be avoided, and adding to it
another obvious one, namely that many forms of toil are not in the category of
things to be avoided, we conclude that toil is not an evil. Since this, then,
is the nature of proof, when we consider that some men are quicker of wit and
others duller, that some are reared in better environment, others in worse,
those of the latter class being inferior in character and native disposition
will require more proofs and more diligent attention to be led to master the
teachings in question and to be moulded by them; just as defective physiques,
when the goal is to restore perfect health, require very diligent and prolonged
treatment. On the other hand such pupils as are of a finer nature and have
enjoyed better training will more easily and more quickly, and with few proofs,
assent to sound reasoning and put it into practice. How true this is we may
readily recognize if we chance to know two lads or young men, of whom one has
been reared in luxury, his body effeminate, his spirit weakened by soft living,
and having besides a dull and torpid disposition; the other reared somewhat in
the Spartan manner, unaccustomed to luxury, practiced in self-restraint, and
ready to listen to sound reasoning. If then we place these two young men in the
position of pupils of a philosopher arguing that death, toil, poverty, and the
like are not evils, or again that life, pleasure, wealth, and the like are not
goods, do you imagine that both will give heed to the argument in the same
fashion, and that one will be persuaded by it in the same degree as the other?
Far from it. The one reluctantly and slowly, and fairly pried loose by a
thousand arguments, will perhaps in the end give sign of assent - I mean of
course the dullard. The other quickly and readily will accept the argument as
cogent and relevant to himself, and will not require many proofs nor a fuller
treatment. Was not just such a lad that Spartan boy who asked Cleanthes the
philosopher if toil was not a
good?[1]
He made it plain that he was so well-endowed by nature and by training for the
practice of virtue as to consider toil closer to the nature of good than of
evil, in that he asked whether toil was not perchance a good, as if it were
conceded that it was not an evil. Thereupon Cleanthes in surprise and
admiration of the boy replied, “Thou art of noble blood, dear child, so noble
the words thou speakest.” [2] Can
you doubt that such a lad would have been readily persuaded not to fear poverty
nor death nor any of the things which seem terrible, and again, not to seek
after wealth nor life nor pleasure?
To come back to the starting point of my discussion, I
repeat that it is mistaken zeal for the teacher, if he be a true philosopher,
to rehearse a multitude of arguments and proofs to his pupils. He should rather
touch upon each one with just measure, seek to penetrate to the very intellect
of his hearer, and present persuasive arguments and such as cannot easily be
refuted. But most of all his treatment should consist in showing himself not
only as one who utters words which are most helpful, but as one who acts
consistently with them. As for the pupil, it is his duty to attend diligently
to what is said and to be on his guard lest he accept unwittingly something
false. But of what he accepts as truth, his effort should not be directed
toward learning numbers of proofs - far from it - but only such as are plain
and lucid. Finally whatever precepts enjoined upon him he is persuaded are
true, these must he follow out in his daily life. For only in this way will
philosophy be of profit to anyone, if to sound teaching he adds conduct in
harmony with it.
NOTES by www.TheStoicLife.Org:
[1] The incident is related in Diogenes Laertius, Lives
of the Philosophers VII, 5 (172).
[2] Odyssey IV, 611.
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See
the article “Stoicism in the Esoteric
Philosophy”, by Carlos Cardoso Aveline. It is available in our associated
websites.
On the role of the esoteric movement in the
ethical awakening of mankind during the 21st century, see the book “The Fire and Light of Theosophical Literature”, by
Carlos Cardoso Aveline.

Published in
2013 by The Aquarian Theosophist,
the volume has 255 pages and can be obtained through Amazon Books.
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